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INTRODUCTION 
At the 2019 Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”) Annual Meeting, 
the panel on Judicial Diversity in Transnational Courts asked, “Why do so few 
women serve on transnational courts and tribunals?”1  That line of feminist inquiry 
has a long tradition. As Catharine MacKinnon observed, “Feminists have this nasty 
habit of counting bodies and refusing not to notice their gender.”2  Underlying the 
panel’s organizing question–and indeed much of feminist jurisprudence–is the belief 
that the presence (or absence) of women has consequences in almost any context. 
Based on personal and professional experience, we share this foundational 
assumption, though we note that the research on whether women judges make a 
difference in outcome is equivocal.3  
Despite our understanding of the intuitive power of asking for more women, we 
do not pursue the panel’s original inquiry. Instead, this essay takes up a second-order 
question: why ask why so few women serve on transnational courts and tribunals? If 
the reason for posing this question is to strengthen these tribunals in their work of 
recognizing and remedying injustice, the question limits the range of potential 
solutions. This perspective is informed by our experience with the Feminist 
Judgments Projects, an international collaboration of feminist scholars and lawyers 
who use feminist reasoning and methods to rewrite judicial opinions.4 The feminist 
 
2 Judicial Diversity in Transnational Courts Session at the 2019 Association of American Law 
Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/yxzb4arr (the session description in the 2019 
AALS Annual Meeting Program asks “Why do so few women and people of color serve on transnational 
courts and tribunals?”). This essay focuses in particular on the “woman” part of the question, but the 
analysis merits extension to a paucity of people of color on the bench, as well.  See infra Part Conclusion. 
3 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: 
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 35 (1988). The “nasty habit of counting bodies” is an empirical starting 
point that one might call asking the “woman question.” Id. Other variations on the “woman question” 
include asking how law fails to take into account the experiences and viewpoints of members of 
historically disadvantaged groups, or what implications the law has for groups of people based on identity 
categories such as sex or gender. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
829, 836 (1990) (“One [feminist legal] method, asking the woman question, is designed to expose how 
the substance of law may silently and without justification submerge the perspectives of women and other 
excluded groups”); MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (3d ed. 2013) 
(describing asking the “woman question” as a way of “tracing out the gender implications of a social 
practice or rule”). 
4 Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench in the New 
Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 603–09 (2003) (providing an overview of research on how 
gender, race and political affiliation impact judicial voting). Compare Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of 
Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996, (1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author) (noting that women and 
African American male judges were more likely to vote in favor of the plaintiff in sex discrimination 
cases) with Jennifer Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's District 
Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 143–44 (2000) (noting that male judges are more sympathetic to 
claims involving “gender discrimination sexual harassment, abortion rights and maternity rights, custody 
battles and equal pay”).  
5 See, e.g., Diana Majury, Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada, 18 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & 
L. 1, 4 (2006); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Rosemary Hunter et al. eds., 2010); 
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: RIGHTING AND REWRITING LAW (Heather Douglas et al. eds., 2014); 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Kathryn M. 
Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) [hereinafter US FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]; NORTHERN/IRISH FEMINIST 
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judgments methodology demonstrates that judges who apply feminist perspectives–
not judges who claim a particular biology or gender–can make a difference in the 
substance and form of judicial opinions. As editors of the U.S. Feminist Judgments 
Project, we specifically declined to guide contributors on what we meant by 
“feminism.”5  From a personal and professional perspective, though, we understand 
feminism as a historical and contemporary movement, related to politics, that 
motivates multiple social, legal and other projects seeking women’s equality.6 At the 
same time, feminism to us is “a movement and mode of inquiry that has grown to 
endorse justice for all people, particularly those historically oppressed or 
marginalized by or through law.”7 Our version of “feminism” therefore is not the 
unique province of “women,” and we believe that both terms must include multiple 
and fluid identities and perspectives.8 
Thus, even if tribunals were full of “feminist” judges, they would be applying 
feminisms that are sufficiently complex, nuanced and different that even majority-
feminist benches would disagree. For that reason, the overall justice project may be 
better served by asking why in transnational courts and tribunals there is so little 
diversity of all kinds. Part I of this essay provides an overview of the limitations of 
using binary categories like “women” and “men.” Part II reframes the initial question 
as part of a broader quest for diversity in decision-making. The essay concludes by 
considering further avenues for inquiry.    
I.    WHAT IS A WOMAN ANYWAY? 
A.   The Definition Problem 
The global population is approximately 49.56% female and 50.44% male.9 Most 
schoolchildren understand this to mean that half of all humans are girls or women, 
and half of all humans are boys or men. But there also are people whose bodies, as 
described by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
 
JUDGMENTS: JUDGES’ TROUBLES AND THE GENDERED POLITICS OF IDENTITY (Máiréad Enright, et al. eds., 
2017); FEMINIST JUDGMENTS OF AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND TE RINO: A TWO-STRANDED ROPE 
(Elisabeth McDonald et al. eds., 2017). There are projects under way in Scotland, India, and Mexico, as 
well as an International Feminist Judgments project, see SCOTTISH FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT, 
https://www.sfjp.law.ed.ac.uk (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); THE FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT INDIA, 
https://fjpindia.wixsite.com/fjpi (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); E-mail from Trish Luker, Co-Editor, 
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, to authors (July 7, 2017, 12:38 AM) (on file with the author) 
(describing Mexico Feminist Judgments Project); Feminist International Judgments Project: Women’s 
Voices in International Law, U. LEICESTER, https://tinyurl.com/y6qm8ef6 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). 
6 US FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 5, at 3. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 3–4. 
10 Population, female (% of total) and Population, male (% of total), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?end=2017&name_desc=false&start=1960&
view=chart (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (providing estimates for 2017 population based on the United 
Nations Population Division’s World Population Prospects: 2017 Revision). 
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"do not fit typical binary notions of male or female bodies."10 Intersex individuals 
may comprise 0.05% to 1.7% of the population.11 
Separate and apart from physical appearance and genetic make-up—typically 
called “sex”—are the related classifications of “gender” and “gender identity.” 
Gender—the socially constructed expectations for behavior and appearance of 
individuals—may or may not correspond to an individual’s sex.12  So, too, gender 
identity, or the perception of oneself as male, female, neither or some combination, 
may be different from one’s sex or gender.13 And further distinct from all three is 
sexual orientation, meaning the sex and/or gender of the individuals one finds 
sexually attractive.14  
B. Binarism in Biology 
There is no universally accepted definition of “woman.” In feminist theory, the 
concept has been the subject of much debate, resulting in recognition of the 
limitations of various options.15 From a biological perspective, sex can be defined in 
terms of one or more attributes of physical appearance, chromosomes, or hormone 
 
11 U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Fact Sheet, Intersex, https://unfe.org/system/unfe-
65-Intersex_Factsheet_ENGLISH.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (using the term “intersex” to refer to 
people “born with sex characteristics [including genitals, gonads and chromosome patterns] that do not 
fit typical binary notions of male or female bodies”).  
12 Id.; see also Melanie Blackless et al., How Sexually Dimorphic Are We? Review and Synthesis, 
12 AM. J. OF HUM. BIOLOGY 151, 151–66 (2000) (estimating frequency of births of infants whose bodies 
do not fit typical binary sex category as high as 2% of live births); ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE 
BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 53 (2000) [hereinafter SEXING THE 
BODY] (claiming 1 in 60 human births might be of people with intersex characteristics). The study by 
Blackless et al. and the work of Fausto-Sterling have been the subject of extensive criticism for use of 
outdated terminology.  Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, 33 
THE SCIENCES 20 (1993) [hereinafter The Five Sexes]. Nevertheless, some intersex groups have embraced 
the studies’ figures. See, e.g., How common is intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/frequency (last visited Oct. 4, 2019).   
13 The U.N. World Health Organization defines gender as “the socially constructed characteristics 
of women and men–such as norms, roles and relationships of and between groups of women and men. It 
varies from society to society and can be changed.” Gender, Equity and Human Rights, Gender, U.N. 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, https://tinyurl.com/yyg6g9hw (last visited Oct. 4, 2019). Sex, in 
contrast, is the “different biological and physiological characteristics of males and females, such as 
reproductive organs, chromosomes, hormones, etc.” Gender, Equity and Human Rights, Glossary of terms 
and tools, U.N. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2011), https://www.who.int/gender-equity-
rights/knowledge/glossary/en/; see also Noa Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. 
REV. 1187, 1209 (2016) (discussing courts’ confusing use of terms “sex” and “gender”). 
14 Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Definitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
https://tinyurl.com/yd43z59j (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (defining gender identity as a person’s “innermost 
concept of self as male, female, a blend of both or neither – how individuals perceive themselves and what 
they call themselves. One's gender identity can be the same or different from their sex assigned at birth”). 
15 See id. (defining sexual orientation as “[a]n inherent or immutable enduring emotional, romantic 
or sexual attraction to other people”). 
16 Paul G. Lannon, Transgender Student Admissions: The Challenge of Defining Gender in A Gender 
Fluid World, BOS. B.J. (Apr. 22, 2015), https://bostonbarjournal.com/category/spring-2015-vol-59-2/. 
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levels, to give just three possibilities.16 Using even one of these approaches can result 
in multiple answers as to an individual’s sex.17  
Rules governing international track and field competitions illustrate the 
difficulty of determining “sex.” The International Association of Athletics 
Federations began to require women to provide a medical certificate of their sex in 
order to compete in sanctioned competitions. 18  The International Olympic 
Committee adopted mandatory sex testing in 1968.19 But physical examinations can 
be inconclusive because an individual may have a large clitoris, a small penis, an 
undeveloped or underdeveloped vagina, or undeveloped or underdeveloped testes.20 
Alternately, a person may have unambiguous (or insufficiently ambiguous) genitalia, 
but other biological characteristics—i.e., genes— associated with a different sex. 
Two decades ago, Anne Fausto-Sterling suggested that there may be five, not 
two, sexes. 21 Although the vocabulary she used now seems outdated (at best) or even 
hostile (at worst),22 she named and recognized multiple sex classifications to argue 
for the end to “corrective” infant genital surgery.23 Fausto-Sterling asserted that 
“[t]he more we look for a simple physical basis for ‘sex,’ the more it becomes clear 
that ‘sex’ is not a pure physical category. What bodily signals and functions we 
define as male or female come already entangled in our ideas about gender.”24  Both 
Fausto-Sterling’s work from decades ago and the possibility of changing one’s 
 
17 JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO COUNSELING 
CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2d ed. 1994) (setting forth eight factors that may 
contribute to the medical determination of an individual’s “sex”); see also GLAAD MEDIA REFERENCE 
GUIDE, at 10 (10th ed. 2016), https://perma.cc/Z7PR-C8ZQ (defining sex as “a combination of bodily 
characteristics including: chromosomes, hormones, internal and external reproductive organs, and 
secondary sex characteristics”). We acknowledge that scientific knowledge and word choices and 
definitions are constantly changing, and thus we do not endorse any particular view of how to define 
“sex.” We fully expect that any present-day knowledge and terminology will (and should) change in the 
future. 
18 See, e.g., Matthew Bramble et al., Psychological Effects of Sex Differentiation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF REPRODUCTION 250 (2d ed. 2018) (noting that in utero exposure of a developing fetus to estrogens or 
androgens does not necessarily lead to development of external genitalia that corresponds with the 
stereotypical “male” or “female” phenotype). 
19 See, e.g., Erin Elizabeth Berry, Respect for The Fundamental Notion of Fairness of Competition: 
The IAAF, Hyperandrogenism, and Women Athletes, 27 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 207, 210 (2012). 
20 Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic 
Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT 65, 68–69 (Wayne Wilson & Edward Derse eds., 2001) 
(describing implementation of International Olympic Committee’s newly-adopted mandatory testing for 
drugs and sex). 
21 Lisa Melton, New Perspectives on the Management of Intersex, 357 LANCET 2110, 2110 (2001) 
(describing variations in genital appearance). 
22 Fausto-Sterling, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at 33. 
23 Writing in 1993, Fausto-Sterling used the labels “males,” “females,” “herms” (for 
“hermaphrodites”), “merms” (“male pseudo-hermaphrodites”) and “ferms” (“female pseudo 
hermaphrodites”). Id. at 21–22. Fausto-Sterling was criticized for this terminology. Eric Vilain et al., We 
Used to Call Them Hermaphrodites, 9 GENETICS IN MED. 65–66 (2007); Ruth Padawer, The Humiliating 
Practice of Sex-Testing Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 28, 2016), https://tinyurl.com/kbaajcd 
(“[t]he word “hermaphrodite” is considered stigmatizing, so physicians and advocates instead use the term 
“intersex” or refer to the condition as D.S.D., which stands for either a disorder or a difference of sex 
development.”). 
24 FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at 78–79. 
25 Id. at 4. 
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external genitalia (and hormone levels) through gender confirmation surgery 25 
demonstrate that physical appearance is hardly the best proxy for sex classification. 
From a genetics perspective, biology students learn that females have two X 
chromosomes and males have an X and Y chromosome.26 But some people’s genes 
do not fall into either category, 27  and some individuals may have “mosaic 
genetics.”28  People with these genetic differences can have the physiology of a 
female or a male, or a physiology that does not fit neatly in the binary gender 
paradigm.29 A recent scientific study suggests that up to one-third of human genes 
operate differently in men and women, and that it is not the X or Y chromosome that 
drives such difference. 30  Given this possibility, for legal scholars to limit their 
understanding of “women” to persons with only XX chromosomes is contrary to 
reality.  
Having moved on from physical examinations and genetic testing, international 
athletic competitions now favor hormone testing of competitors. Hormone testing 
has resulted in few definitive results, instead generating rounds of tests followed by 
a series of lawsuits and appeals.31  The process of classifying international athletic 
 
26 See Gender Confirmation Surgeries, AM. SOC. PLASTIC SURGEONS, 
https://www.plasticsurgery.org/reconstructive-procedures/gender-confirmation-surgeries (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2019) (describing different surgical options for patients who would like to change their external 
appearance to match the gender they feel themselves to be). The American Society of Plastic Surgeons 
reported that more than 3, 200 of these procedures were performed in 2016.  Alexandra Sifferlin, Gender 
Confirmation Surgery is on the Rise in the U.S., TIME (May 22, 2017), 
http://time.com/4787914/transgender-gender-confirmation-surgery/ (attributing increase in number of 
surgeries to changes in medical care coverage and greater education of doctors and the public about the 
need for these surgeries). 
27 See Men and Women: The Differences are in the Genes, SCIENCEDAILY.COM (Mar. 23, 2005), 
https://tinyurl.com/ydho4rn3 (reporting results of scientific study by Pennsylvania State University 
showing significant X-linked gene expression in females). 
28 See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law 
and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 281 (1999) (describing array of variation in chromosomes). Such 
chromosomal variation may or may not impact sex development; Padawer, supra note 22.  
29 What Is Intersex? INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). 
30 See generally FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY, supra note 12, at chapter 3; see also 46, XX 
Testicular Disorder of Sex Development, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE 
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/46xx-testicular-disorder-of-sex-development. 
31 See Moran Gershoni & Shmuel Pietrokovski, The Landscape of Sex-Differential Transcriptome 
and its Consequent Selection in Human Adults, 15 BMC BIOLOGY 1 (2017) (reporting results of RNA-
sequencing from 544 adults); Jenny Graves, Not Just About Sex: Throughout Our Bodies, Thousands of 
Genes Act Differently in Men and Women, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 31, 2017), 
https://tinyurl.com/y594tnyq (elaborating on implications of study by Gershone & Petrokovski). 
32 In 2014, officials barred Indian sprinter Dutee Chand from track competition when testing 
revealed that her body contains elevated levels of androgens (male sex hormones like testosterone). Chand 
v. Athletics Federation of India, CAS 2014/A/3759 (Ct. of Arb. for Sport 2015). International attention 
continues to focus on South African middle-distance runner and two-time Olympic champion Caster 
Semenya. Katrina Karkazis & Rebecca Jordan-Young, The Treatment of Caster Semenya Shows Athletics’ 
Bias Against Women of Color, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y8z29k82; see 
also Jeré Longman, Track’s New Gender Rules Could Exclude Some Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
25, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/y3odj5wy (describing the alternatives for athletes who refuse to artificially 
lower their testosterone levels as entering competitions for men, entering competitions for intersex 
athletes, if any exist, changing distance specialties or not participating in elite competitions). In May 2019, 
the Court for Arbitration in Sport rejected Semenya’s appeal of the regulations promulgated by the 
International Association of Athletics Federations that would require her to take medication to suppress 
her natural levels of testosterone, if Semenya wishes to compete in middle-distance at IAAF-sanctioned 
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competitors as “male” or “female” reveals the exercise of power that is involved in 
defining who is a woman or a man—no matter what the context.32 First, a governing 
body must decide how sex will be determined. Then, someone must physically test 
the candidates to assign them to categories. Finally, someone must police the 
category boundaries.  
In addition to biological complexity, the number of people identifying as neither 
male nor female is increasing rapidly. A 2017 poll by the Harris group found that 
12% of people aged 18-34 self-identify as other than cisgender.33 A similar survey 
by the National Center for Transgender Equality showed that the respondents who 
identified as transgender wrote in more than 500 unique gender terms with which 
they identified, including non-binary, multi-gender, bigender and agender. 34 
Moreover, as Heath Fogg Davis notes, these are studies of people who identify as 
transgender, which means that the numbers within the general population are likely 
higher.35 Dr. Diane Erehnsaft calls the expanding number of persons identifying as 
transgender, gender fluid or genderqueer a “new gender revolution. It's erased boxes 
and created gender infinity instead.”36 
C.  Binarism in Law and Culture 
Similar to scientific ideas about sex and gender, the law’s treatment of sex and 
gender is on a collision course with reality. For the most part, the law operates as if 
gender were “a fixed phenomenon that derives naturally from an individual's 
biological sex.”37 One commentator notes that “it is almost ludicrous to maintain that 
sex discrimination, sexual identification, or sexual identity takes place on the level 
of biology or genitals. Yet the law continues to insist that they do.”38  
For example, Title VII has been slow to protect sexual minorities, particularly 
transgender people and people whose gender expression does not fit the binary of 
male/female. Ann McGinley observes that “[t]he problem of adequately protecting 
sexual minorities under Title VII lies in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a 
view that identifies men and women as polar opposites and that sees gender as 
naturally flowing from biological sex.” 39  Anti-discrimination law can handle 
discrimination when it fits neatly into traditional categories. Behavior or identity 
 
events. Hailey Middlebrook, Court Rules Against Caster Semenya in IAAF Testosterone Case, RUNNERS 
WORLD (May 1, 2019), https://www.runnersworld.com/news/a27332526/caster-semenya-court-ruling 
(explaining ruling and its negative impact on Semenya’s ability to compete in prestigious international 
competitions). 
33 This idea borrows from Foucault’s notion of the legal subject. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTOIRE 
DE SYSTÈMES DE PENSÉE, ANÉE 1980-1981 (1981) (Fr.); see also HEATH FOGG DAVIS, BEYOND TRANS: 
DOES GENDER MATTER? 10–11 (2017) (“The administrative discretion to decide who is female and who 
is male is the essence of sex identity discrimination…[and] a specific subcategory of sexism.”). 
34 GLAAD, ACCELERATING ACCEPTANCE 4 (2017), 
https://www.glaad.org/publications/accelerating-acceptance-2017. 
35 SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 40 (2016). 
36 DAVIS, supra note 33, at 11.  
37 Jon Brooks, Boy? Girl? Both? Neither? A New Generation Overthrows Gender, KQED SCIENCE 
(April 24, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y9utnq2c. 
38 Id. 
39 Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: Disaggregating Sex from 
Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 40 (1995). 
40 Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and Employment 
Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715 (2010).   
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outside this norm presents a situation similar to what Catharine MacKinnon called a 
“paradigm trauma” that creates a “crisis time for the doctrine.”40  
The problem of defining “woman” in legal and cultural settings is elucidated by 
several examples. For example, in Corbett v. Corbett,41 the court heard “extensive 
testimony from psychiatrists, gynecologists, endocrinologists, physicians, and state-
appointed sexual organ inspectors”42 to attempt to discern whether April Ashley 
Corbett, a transgender woman, was actually a “woman” for purposes of UK divorce 
law.43 Ashley Corbett had male chromosomes and had been born with male genitalia, 
but after surgery had female hormone levels and “remarkably good” female 
genitals.44  She fully identified as a woman and presented so convincingly as a 
woman that the court noted her remarkably compelling “pastiche of femininity.”45 
Nevertheless, the court disregarded this evidence as well as Ashley Corbett’s own 
testimony and concluded she was male, relying mainly on her chromosomes and 
genitals.46 The court therefore granted Arthur Corbett’s petition for divorce, on the 
grounds that the marriage had been void ab initio because Ashley Corbett was a 
“man,” and same-sex marriage was not possible under UK law at the time.47 
The cultural battle over single-sex bathrooms is another example of the 
difficulties in defining certain identity categories.48 Ruth Colker notes that signs on 
sex-segregated restrooms rely on stereotypes, yet “few women probably recognize 
themselves as a stick figure wearing a triangle dress or skirt.”49  Decades before the 
issue erupted in North Carolina,50 Colker worked at a university where only the 
men’s bathroom had showers, so her employer furnished her with a “woman in 
shower” placard to place on the entrance to the men’s room when she wished to 
shower. This caused her some tongue-in-cheek “gender confusion” because her 
 
41 MACKINNON, supra note 2, at 36.  
42 Corbett v. Corbett [1970] All ER 33 (Fam). 
43 Id. It is difficult to imagine what a sexual organ inspector is, how someone would qualify to be 
one, and what kind of intrusive process is involved in submitting to such an inspection.  
44 Id. (discussed in Franke, supra note 39, at 45). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 For a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between sex-segregated bathrooms and equality, 
see Mary Anne Case, All the World's the Men's Room, 74 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1655 (2007); Mary Anne 
Case, Changing Room? A Quick Tour of Men's and Women's Restrooms in U.S. Law over the Last Decade, 
from the U.S. Constitution to Local Ordinances, 13 PUB. CULTURE 333 (2000). 
50 Ruth Colker, Public Restrooms, Flipping the Default Rules, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 145, 150 n.30 (2017) 
(describing results of image search for male and female restrooms, noting that the male figures always 
have long trousers). But, see #ItWasNeverADress, https://itwasneveradress.com (last visited Oct. 12, 
2019) (reimagining the triangle dress a superhero’s cape). 
51 See, e.g., Amber Phillips, The Tumultuous History of North Carolina’s Bathroom Bill, Which is 
On Its Way to Repeal, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 30, 2017) (providing overview of controversy that 
followed the February, 2016 passage by the Charlotte City Council of a law that would prohibit 
discrimination in public accommodations against gay or transgender customers), 
https://tinyurl.com/y2q3gq3l; Camila Domonoske, North Carolina Repeals Portions of Controversial 
“Bathroom Bill,” NPR. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y2zh9c52 (describing prohibition until 2020 
on local jurisdictions from passing laws that would protect LGBT people).  
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gender was “different” depending on the purpose for which she was using the facility 
(male to shower, female to use the toilet).51  
Similarly, Patricia Williams wrote in the late 1980s of the experience of a trans 
woman law student who was not permitted by other students to use either the male 
or female bathrooms. 52  The student approached Williams because the student’s 
failure to fit within the gender binary rendered her a “nobody” when it came to using 
a bathroom.53 Non-binary people report similar problems even of self-policing: if 
there are only men’s and women’s rooms, which does a person choose, if the person 
identifies as neither?54 
The reactions of some feminists to the “paradigm trauma” of who-counts-as-a-
woman provide further examples. The Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival for years 
banned trans women based on its “festival for womyn-born womyn” policy.55 This 
policy led to a boycott by state and national equality groups in 2014; the festival 
elected to shut down rather than allow trans women to attend the festival.56 In the 
North Carolina bathroom controversy, some feminists have aligned with the 
fundamentalist Christians in backing the law requiring strict sex-segregated 
bathrooms.57  
Many women’s colleges have struggled to define who is a “woman.” Compare 
Mount Holyoke’s policy, which allows admission to any student who “is female or 
who identifies as a woman” (which appears to include anyone except for someone 
who is “born male and identifies as a man”) with Smith College, which does not 
permit applications from trans men (or anyone identifying as male) or students who 
are gender non-binary.58  Smith College relies entirely on admissions material to 
make its judgment about gender, but both Wellesley and Bryn Mawr require 
information beyond the admissions material.59 Wellesley College “will consider for 
 
52 Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 56, 47–48 
(1995). 
53 Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. 
L.  REV. 2128, 2144–46 (1989). 
54 Id. 
55 Brooks, supra note 37.  
56 Kat Callahan, I Don’t Care About MichFest’s Trans Exclusion, You Shouldn’t Either, JEZEBEL 
(Aug. 14, 2014, 10:15 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y4e4u5fp. 
57 Diane Anderson-Minshall, Op-ed: Michfest’s Founder Chose to Shut Down Rather Than Change 
with The Times, ADVOCATE, (Apr. 4, 2015, 7:15 PM), 
https://www.advocate.com/commentary/2015/04/24/op-ed-michfests-founder-chose-shut-down-rather-
change-times. 
58 See, e.g., Kaeley Triller Haver, A Rape Survivor Speaks Out Against Transgender Bathrooms, 
THE FEDERALIST, (Nov. 23, 2015), http://thefederalist.com/2015/11/23/a-rape-survivor-speaks-out-
about-transgender-bathrooms/ (arguing that men will take advantage of bathroom sex desegregation to 
sexually assault women); Fr. Mark Hodges, Proposed Bathroom Bill Will Keep ‘Transgender’ Men Out 
of Girls' Bathrooms in Texas, LIFE SITE, (Jan. 9, 2017, 10:47 PM) 
https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/public-reacts-to-texas-proposed-bathroom-privacy-law-with-praise-
protests (describing need for the “Women's Privacy Act” to protect women's privacy while using a 
restroom).  
59 Compare Admission of Transgender Students, MOUNT HOLYOKE, https://tinyurl.com/yy24nws7; 
with Gender Identity & Expression, SMITH COLLEGE, https://tinyurl.com/y3n2xwkh. For a discussion of 
the category dilemma raised by single sex educational institutions, see Davis, supra note 33, at 85–86 
(discussing the case of Calliope Wong, a transgender woman denied admission to Smith College).  
60 See Lannon supra, note 16 (calling the decision to probe beyond admissions material 
“remarkable”).  
 327                           CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                           [Vol. 34:3    
admission any applicant who lives as a woman and consistently identifies as 
a woman,” a definition that excludes trans men and some others who are outside the 
binary.60 Bryn Mawr's policy is open to transgender and intersex individuals, but 
only if they “live and identify as women at the time of application,” and trans men, 
as long as they have not taken “medical or legal steps to identify as male.”61 
D. Binarism in the Twenty-First Century 
The twenty-first century has brought increased visibility of gender fluidity,62  
making the term “woman” seem anachronistic in some contexts. Although the terms 
“men” and “women” likely still function as cognitive or linguistic shorthand for more 
nuanced understandings of the terms,63 framing any policy discussion in terms of 
“men” and “women” will fail to account for biological variety, individual difference, 
diverse gender identity, multiple sexual orientations, and the significant role that 
society plays in constructing these identifiers. To ask, “Where are the women?” (as 
one of us has done frequently and publicly)64 is, upon critical reflection, to risk 
converting persons who do not fit into the binary into “unnatural outcasts.”65  
If the global culture is starting to move away from binary thinking about sex, 
then feminist legal scholars should do the same. Legal scholars who believe in the 
value of diverse perspectives on the bench should support methods that “erase 
boxes” 66  and reconfigure the “woman question.” 67  As already discussed, the 
question of “women” on the courts raises myriad definitional issues. While feminists 
may agree that greater diversity on the bench is necessary for political legitimacy, as 
Sally Kenney argues,68 counting “women” is complicated.69 Moreover, if feminists 
agree that society constructs the meaning of both sex and gender,70 then the feminist 
 
61 Mission and Gender Policy, WELLESLEY COLLEGE, https://www.wellesley.edu/news/gender-
policy. 
62 Transgender Applicants, BRYN MAWR COLLEGE, 
https://www.brynmawr.edu/admissions/transgender-applicants. 
63 Karina Collins, How to Market to the Gender Fluid, MEDIUM.COM (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/how-to-improve-your-marketing-in-the-era-of-gender-fluidity-
d3fefb25ce28 (calling gender fluidity, as an idea popularized and embraced by young people born in 1982 
and after “the new cool”). 
64 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (describing identity 
categories as “strategies for simplifying the perceptual environment and acting on less-than-perfect 
information”). 
65 Bridget J. Crawford, Where are the Women? Faulkner Law Review Edition, 
FEMINISTLAWPROFESSORS.COM (Aug. 31, 2017), 
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2017/08/where-are-the-women-faulkner-law-review-edition; 
Bridget J. Crawford, Where are the Women? Not in this Issue of “The Tax Lawyer”, 
FEMINISTLAWPROFESSORS.COM (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://www.feministlawprofessors.com/2017/04/where-are-the-women-not-in-this-issue-of-the-tax-
lawyer-review. 
66 McGinley, supra note 40, at 718. 
67 Id. 
68 MACKINNON, supra note 2.  
69 SALLY KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER 126, 
175 (2012).  
70 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 34 (2d ed. 
1999) (arguing that gender is a social construct and performance and is far from immutable). 
71 See generally id.  
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project must reconfigure the details of its “nasty habit of counting bodies and 
refusing not to notice their gender.”71 Without more fully considering these concepts, 
the inquiry is intellectually and politically precarious.72  
To reframe the question, we need to better understand the purpose of asking for 
more “women” on the courts. The goal may be to have more judges who look like 
women so that more individuals in our society will be able to see themselves on the 
bench.73 But that purpose might require appearance- and presentation-policing that 
many feminists can and should reject.74  
For other feminists, asking for more women on the bench might be shorthand 
for seeking judges who are sensitive to “women’s issues” or “women’s lived 
experiences.” But the newcomers most likely to be placed on tribunals and in courts 
will be women who most closely resemble—and are least threatening to—those in 
power.75 
Rather than the question posed to this panel, we take up Mari Matsuda’s 
invitation to ask the “other question,” taking into account the interconnectedness of 
all subordination.76 With an expansive view of feminism, one can ask how a judge’s 
lived experience, identity, and perspective inform decision-making. Increasing 
diversity on the bench might correlate to diversity in sex, gender, gender identity, or 
sexual orientation, but it ought not be confined to those qualities. What might courts 
and tribunals look like if more judges had lived in poverty; grew up in rural areas; 
suffered discrimination based on gender, race, religion, nationality, or disability; 
lived in fear of group-based violence; or otherwise struggled because of a 
marginalized position in society?  
II.   THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE(S) 
Suggesting that the effects of unrepresentative courts and unequal justice will 
be alleviated by appointing more women to the bench is rooted in the kind of binary 
thinking that has long entangled women. This solution evades the real problem that 
feminist legal scholars presumably want to solve: the lack of diverse perspectives on 
the bench. As Katherine Franke describes the problem: 
 
Defining sex in biological or anatomical terms represents a serious error that 
fails to account for the complex behavioral aspects of sexual identity. In so 
 
72 MACKINNON, supra note 2. 
73 WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 10. 
74 KENNEY, supra note 69 at 56–58, n.84 (recognizing the “role model” argument).  
75 See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank and Trust, 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing that this is 
a serious danger); DAVIS, supra note 33, at 89–90 (discussing how some responses to transgender 
woman’s application to Smith College centered on the opinion that she looked “obviously male”).  
76 Rosemary Hunter, Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?, 15 INT’L J. L. PROF. 7, 7–8 (2008); 
see also MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 37 (explaining that women who would likely benefit would be 
“women who have been able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm, at least 
on paper”).   
77 Mari Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (“The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination 
is through a method I call ‘ask the other question.’ When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where 
is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in 
this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the class interests in this?’ Working 
in coalition forces us to look for both the obvious and non-obvious relationships of domination, helping 
us to realize that no form of subordination ever stands alone.”). 
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doing, this definition elides the degree to which most, if not all, differences 
between men and women are grounded not in biology, but in gender 
normativity.77  
 
Feminist theory’s attempts to define “woman” have been riddled by essentialism 
and stereotyping. A prominent example occurred in the 1980s, largely due to the 
success of Carol Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice, when feminist theory exploded 
with theories of women’s relational nature and “connectedness.” Scholar Suzanna 
Sherry summarized the claimed essential difference: “the basic feminine sense of 
self is connected to the world, the basic masculine sense of self is separate.” This 
difference suggested that due to factors including pregnancy, child-rearing 
responsibilities, menstruation, and intercourse, “women have a ‘sense’ of existential 
‘connection’ to other human life which men do not.” 78  That many people who 
identified as women did not experience any of these physical connections did nothing 
to stop the wave of scholarship on women’s “different” voice.79 
Feminists used Carol Gilligan’s sociological data to reach wide-ranging 
conclusions. Among them were that women’s “special” sense of connection created 
“a way of learning, a path of moral development, an aesthetic sense, and a view of 
the world and of one’s place within it which sharply contrasts with men’s.”80 And 
some feminist legal scholars generated an entire scholarly oeuvre about how 
women’s “ethic of care” could change the law, legal education, legal practice, and 
judging.81 
 The “connection” theory of womanhood has been roundly critiqued, 82  but 
vestiges remain. Consider, for example, a speech by Baroness Hale, the first woman 
in the House of Lords; she resists the notion that women judges are “different” and 
likely to make “different decisions” from their male counterparts.83 At the same time, 
she elevates the importance of stereotypically female work such as changing diapers 
and cooking meals for children: “I would like to think that a wider experience of the 
world is helpful: knowing a little about bearing and bringing up children must make 
some difference.”84 
 Similarly emphasizing the presumed difference of women and girls, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a separate concurring opinion in Safford v. Redding, 
where the U.S. Supreme Court found that a school’s strip search of a 13-year old 
 
78 Franke, supra at 39. 
79 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1988). 
80 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's 
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference 
to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in the Law, 15 VT. L. REV. 1 (1990). 
81 West, supra note 78, at 15–16 (calling this feminism’s “official” story).   
82 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 79; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986); Minna J. Kotkin, Professionalism, Gender 
and the Public Interest: The Advocacy of Protection, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 157 (1995).  
83 KENNEY, supra note 69, at 30–38 (rejecting “difference” as a basis for calling for more women 
judges); MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 38-39; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 602–05 (1990).  
84 Brenda Hale, Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?, PUB. L. 
489, 504 (2001). 
85 Id. 
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female student violated her Fourth Amendment rights.85 News reports said the case 
“revealed a gender fault line at the court,” because Justice Ginsburg said that her 
(then all-male) colleagues “have never been a 13-year-old girl.  It’s a very sensitive 
age for a girl. I don’t think that my colleagues, some of them, quite understood.”86 
Questions by the male Justices during oral argument seemed to imply that requiring 
a 13-year-old girl to strip down to her underwear is not traumatic because it is akin 
to a bathing suit or like changing for gym class.87  
Ginsburg’s comments have been frequently cited as evidence for the need for 
more women on the bench to understand the perspectives of the women and young 
girls.88 But if instead of asking the “woman question” Ginsburg had asked the “other 
question,” she might have reached the conclusion that a 13-year-old boy would be 
equally embarrassed, shy, and traumatized, by being strip searched by school 
administrators. 89  As masculinities scholars have pointed out, the male cultural 
imperative requires even young teenagers to “man up” and accept bodily indignities 
when they resemble typical “locker room” scenarios.90  
A different strand of feminist theory, one that examines women in terms of their 
structural and interpersonal subordination to men,91 avoids the “woman as caregiver” 
trap but has other weaknesses. Under anti-subordination theory, what women have 
in common is a shared experience of being devalued as women.92  Patriarchy, and 
women’s position in it, is maintained through a set of purportedly neutral, objective 
standards of merit that mask the masculine ideal. 93  Constant threats of sexual 
violence against women, pornography and harassment, and the devaluation of 
characteristics associated with women buttress the system of subordination. 94 In a 
patriarchal society, “women” are those who occupy the lowest rung. 
Many feminist scholars disagree that anti-subordination theory describes all 
“women’s” experiences, pointing out that women have multiple types of oppressions 
 
86 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
87 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Child’s Rights Violated by Strip Search, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/politics/26scotus.html. 
88 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–22, 44–46, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding,557 
U.S. 364 (2009) (No. 08-479). 
89 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, ABC NEWS (May 6, 2009, 1:25 
AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ginsburg-court-woman/story?id=7513795. 
90 Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (No. 08-479), 2009 WL 870022, at 5–
8 (discussing the social science documenting trauma from strip searches to children and young adults, 
gender neutral).  
91 Cynthia Godsoe & Margo Kaplan, Rewritten Opinion in Michael M. v. Superior Court, in 
FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 268 (Kathryn M. 
Stanchi et al. eds., 2016) (noting that the California statutory rape law at issue ignored “the trauma of 
…young male victims…[whose] sexual exploitation has long been ignored.”); see also DAN KINDLON & 
MICHAEL THOMPSON, RAISING CAIN: PROTECTING THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF BOYS 165 (2009) (describing 
how boys are taught “to be willing to take the bullet—take the emotional pain—and act as if it doesn’t 
matter”). 
92 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 3; Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and 
Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005–08 (1986).  
93 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 638–39 (1983). 
94 MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 36.  
95 Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards A Substantive Feminism, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 21, 23–29 (1999). 
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to resist, and so it is not appropriate to create some sort of hierarchy, putting sexism 
before any other concerns.95 Angela Harris has emphasized that it is inaccurate to 
combine all women’s experiences into one “devaluation,” as the experiences of poor 
women and women of color are qualitatively different from those of many white 
women.96 Similarly, several lesbian feminist theorists have distanced themselves 
from the description of women’s experiences as always those of subordination, 
giving as examples their contrasting experiences with pornography 97  and their 
experience of escaping patriarchy in their romantic and sexual lives.98 Still other 
women, like the rural Pennsylvania woman quoted at the beginning of this essay, 
reject the idea that they are subordinated at all. And, to be sure, the emphasis of anti-
subordination feminist theory on women’s experiences under patriarchy can also 
sometimes transform into devaluation of the experiences of trans, lesbian, gay or 
other gender-non-conforming people.99   
These critiques serve as a reminder to avoid essentialist pitfalls when talking 
about the need for more “women” on courts and tribunals. Chief among these pitfalls 
is the assumption that “women” judges will transform the institutions they serve 
simply because they are women. As Rosemary Hunter writes: “Why did we think 
that women would transform institutions without simultaneously—or alternatively—
being transformed by them? Why did we believe that women appointed to positions 
of power would be ‘representative’ of women as a group, rather than being those 
who most resemble the traditional incumbents and are thus considered least likely to 
disturb the status quo?”100 Catharine MacKinnon has long observed that the women 
who benefit from feminism’s emphasis on formal equality are “mostly women who 
have been able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm 
. . .. They are the qualified, the least of sex discrimination’s victims.”101  
This factor is multiplied because the system of judicial appointment is marked 
by bias and elitism. Deborah Rhode calls this the “misleading myth of meritocracy,” 
the dangerous and false idea that opportunity and advancement result from a system 
untainted by bias.102 Sally Kenney recounts her frustration that whenever she talks 
 
96 See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 35 (2d ed. 2000) (saying that 
feminism “can end the war between the sexes. It can transform relationships so that alienation, 
competition, and dehumanization that characterize human interaction can be replaced with feelings of 
intimacy mutuality, and camaraderie,” and, therefore, changing gender roles need not be the top priority 
at all times). 
97 Harris, supra note 83, at 596–97. 
98 See generally Mary C. Dunlap, Sexual Speech and the State: Putting Pornography in Its Place, 
17 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 359 (1987). 
99 See Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY 
WOMEN’S L.J. 191 (1989). 
100 See, e.g., Elinor Burkett, Opinion, What Makes a Woman?, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/what-makes-a-woman.html (arguing, with 
controversial effect, that Caitlin Jenner is not “really” a woman because she has not lived as a woman 
under patriarchy); see also DAVIS, supra note 33, at 89–90 (asking “if female socialization is the litmus 
test for being considered “female” then how much time lived “as female” is enough to earn one’s “woman 
card”). 
101 Hunter, supra note 76, at 8. 
102 MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 37. 
103 DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 147–48 (1997); 
Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 588 (1996). 
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about women on the bench, she is urged to modify “women” with the word “well-
qualified,” as if her goal is to populate the bench with unqualified women.103  
Federal judges, for example, tend to be chosen from prestigious clerkships and 
big corporate law firms, two professional enclaves that tend to favor white, wealthy 
and male candidates.104 The more than 1300 sitting federal judges overwhelmingly 
attended Harvard (140 judges) and other elite law schools. 105   These elite law 
schools–including Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Berkeley, NYU–tend to skew white 
and wealthy.106 Indeed, every step leading up to that first appointment to the bench–
from academic indicators to standardized testing and beyond–embeds race, class and 
gender bias.107  
While calling for more “women” in the judiciary may yield a short-term gain, 
the real work lies in broadening the definition of who is “qualified” to be a judge. 
That requires open acknowledgment of the biases inherent in the admissions 
processes that lead to judicial positions: elite law schools, clerkships, prestigious law 
firms and other gate-keepers. Otherwise, the effort will yield only female judges who 
“are able to construct a biography that somewhat approximates the male norm.”108  
Getting a different result requires us to ask a different question.109  
CONCLUSION 
When we argue that the panel’s inquiry should be reframed, we must remember 
that women and men from populations underrepresented in the law—for example, 
people of color, people who grew up poor—may not be eager to join a campaign (or 
even attend an AALS program) focused on “more women.” According to Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, many Black women continue to be ambivalent “about the degree of 
political and social capital that ought to be expended toward challenging gender 
 
104 Sally J. Kenney, Toward a Feminist Political Theory of Judging: Neither the Nightmare nor the 
Noble Dream, 17 NEV. L.J. 549, 557–59 (2017) (“calling for so-called merit selection does little to foster 
a diverse and representative bench and obfuscates the nature of judging”). 
105 KENNEY, supra note 69, at 25 (noting that long after women comprised 50% of law students, 
“vital gatekeepers” did not recommend women for prestigious clerkships and the United States Supreme 
Court still has mostly white, male clerks). 
106 See Adam Feldman, Law Schools, Judges, and Government Attorneys, EMPIRICAL SCOTUS (Sept. 
10, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/09/10/law-schools/ (providing data on law school affiliation 
of United States Attorneys, sitting federal judges, state attorney generals and state solicitor generals). 
107 See, e.g., 2017 1L Enrollment by Gender & Race/Ethnicity, AM. B. ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics (follow “2017 IL Enrollment by 
Gender & Race/Ethnicity” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). As an example, Harvard Law School 
admitted 560 students in 2017; of those only 178, or roughly 32%, are minority. Richard H. Sander, Class 
in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 632–33 (2011) (reporting that only 5% of 
students in elite law schools come from lower socio-economic classes).  
108 See, e.g., ALL. FOR JUSTICE, BROADENING THE BENCH: PROFESSIONAL DIVERSITY AND JUDICIAL 
NOMINATIONS (2016), https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Professional-Diversity-
Report.pdf (noting that vast majority of Federal judiciary comes from those who practiced as corporate 
lawyers and prosecutors); see also TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS 
IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2019) (noting the lack of diversity in state judiciaries). 
109 MACKINNON, supra note 3, at 37.  
110 See Kenney, supra note 104, at 558–59 (“I care about more than the legal qualifications of 
prospective judges. I care about their judicial philosophy, and I care about their views on social facts and 
most importantly, their willingness to subject their views to rigorous empirical examination.”). 
 333                           CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                           [Vol. 34:3    
barriers, particularly when the challenges might conflict with the antiracism 
agenda.”110   
As the distant and recent past indicates, white women have a history of choosing 
their racial privilege over solidarity with poor women or women of color.111 The 
2018 midterm elections illustrate this point. Stacey Abrams, an African-American 
woman running for governor in Georgia against a white man, garnered only 25% of 
the white female vote.112 A white woman, Cindy Hyde-Smith, won a Mississippi 
Senate seat running against an African-American man, even after making racially 
charged jokes about voter suppression, saying she would be on the “front row” if a 
supporter invited her to a public hanging and posing in a Confederate cap.113 Ms. 
Hyde-Smith is the first female senator from Mississippi because white women 
supported her,114 but her election is hardly a victory for the broader social justice 
project. 
If elite white women are the ones who will benefit from a call for more “women” 
judges, it is imperative to reframe the question. Instead of asking for more women, 
we should clearly call, as Kimberlé Crenshaw urged almost two decades ago, for the 
elevation of women who have the least professional capital. Crenshaw relates the 
story of nineteenth century feminist Anna Julia Cooper. After a community leader 
claimed that wherever he entered, the Black race entered with him, Cooper observed, 
"Only the Black Woman can say, when and where I enter . . . then and there the 
whole Negro race enters with me."115  Cooper’s story reinforces the message that 
efforts to elevate the “qualified . . . the least of sex discrimination’s victims,” will 
mean that only elite women will advance. Feminists would be better served by a 
focus on those most hurt by discrimination. As Mari Matsuda frames it, “dismantling 
any one form of subordination is impossible without dismantling every other . . . 
particularly in the women of color movement, the answer is that no person is free 
until the last and the least of us is free.”116 Truly, all will enter with the elevation of 
women who are multiply-burdened by not only sex discrimination but also 
 
111 Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
139, 161 (1989); see also Danielle Young, Tarana Burke Explains Why Black Women Don’t Think 
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discrimination based on race, class, disability, immigration status, gender identity, 
sexuality or other personal identities beyond biological sex.  
This essay has challenged the foundational question of the panel but proceeds 
from the belief that feminist legal theorists share a commitment to facilitating entry 
for all women to enter, not just privileged white women, and not white women first. 
The last of these beliefs may be unfounded or even controversial.  After all, the 
experience of human nature is that one naturally pushes for changes or reforms that 
will benefit oneself.117  Yet our version of feminism is broad. We conceive of it as a 
project that wants equality and advancement for not only women but for all 
historically disadvantaged groups. And “women” must be understood to mean 
women in all of their complexities, with all of their multiple identities.  
Calling for more “women” is easy.  Achieving true diversity is harder.  
Let’s begin. 
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